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Abstract. Many cryptographic systems based on elliptic curves are proven se-
cure in the Random Oracle Model, assuming there exist probabilistic functions
that map elements in some domain (e.g. bitstrings) onto uniformly and indepen-
dently distributed points in a curve. When implementing such systems, and in
order for the proof to carry over to the implementation, those mappings must be
instantiated with concrete constructions whose behavior does not deviate signif-
icantly from random oracles. In contrast to other approaches to public-key cryp-
tography, where candidates to instantiate random oracles have been known for
some time, the first generic construction for hashing into ordinary elliptic curves
indifferentiable from a random oracle was put forward only recently by Brier et
al. We present a machine-checked proof of this construction. The proof is based
on an extension of the CertiCrypt framework with logics and mechanized tools
for reasoning about approximate forms of observational equivalence, and inte-
grates mathematical libraries of group theory and ellipticcurves.
1 Introduction
Following an established trend [?], the prevailing methodology for building secure cryp-
tosystems is to conduct a rigorous analysis that proves security under standard hypothe-
ses. Sometimes this analysis is performed assuming that some c ponents of the sys-
tem have an ideal behavior. However, ideal functionalitiesare difficult or even impossi-
ble to realize, leading to situations where provably securesystems have no secure im-
plementation. An alternative methodology is to devise system based on constructions
that do not deviate significantly from ideal ones, and to account for these deviations in
the security analysis. Statistical distance is a natural notio for quantifying the deviation
between idealized functionalities and their implementations.
Verifiable security [?, ?] is an emerging approach that advocates the use of inter-
active proof assistants and automated provers to establishthe security of cryptographic
systems. It improves on the guarantees of provable securityby delivering fully machine-
checked and independently verifiable proofs. TheCertiCrypt framework, built on top
of theCoq proof assistant, is one prominent tool that realizes verifiable security by us-
ing standard techniques from programming languages and program verification.Cer-
tiCrypt is built around the central notion of observational equivalence of probabilis-
tic programs, which unfortunately cannot model accuratelyother weaker, quantitative,
forms of equivalence. As a result,CertiCrypt cannot be used as it is to reason about
the statistical distance of distributions generated by probabilistic programs. More gen-
erally, the development of quantitative notions of equivalence is quite recent and rather
limited; see Section?? for an account of related work.
One main contribution of this article is the formalization of several quantitative no-
tions of program equivalence and logics for reasoning aboutthem. More specifically, we
extendCertiCrypt with the notion of statistical distance and develop a logic to upper
bound the distance between distributions generated by probabilistic programs. More-
over, we introduce approximate and conditional variants ofobservational equivalence
and develop equational theories for reasoning about them.
In a landmark article, Maurer et al. [?] introduce the concept of indifferentiability to
justify rigorously the substitution of an idealized component in a cryptographic system
by a concrete implementation. In a subsequent article, Coron et al. [?] argue that a
secure hash function should be indifferentiable from a random oracle, i.e. a perfectly
random function. Although the random oracle model has been under fierce criticism [?]
and the indifferentiability framework turned out to be weakr than initially believed [?,
?], it is generally accepted that proofs in these models provide some evidence that a
system is secure. Not coincidentally, all finalists in the ong i g NIST Cryptographic
Hash Algorithm competition have been proved indifferentiable from a random oracle.
Elliptic curve cryptography allows to build efficient public-key cryptographic sys-
tems with comparatively short keys and as such is an attractive solution for resource-
constrained applications. In contrast to other approachesto public-key cryptography,
where candidates to instantiate random oracles have been known for some time, ad-
equate constructions for hashing into ordinary elliptic curves have remained elusive.
In 2010, Brier et al. [?] proposed the first generic construction indifferentiablefrom a
random oracle into elliptic curves. This construction is ofpractical significance since
it allows to securely implement elliptic curve cryptosystems. We present a machine-
checked and independently verifiable proof of the security of this construction. The
proof involves the various notions of equivalence we develop in this paper and is thus
an excellent testbed for evaluating the applicability of our methods. Additionally, the
proof builds on several large developments (including Théry’s formalization of elliptic
curves [?] and Gonthier et al. formalization of finite groups [?]) and demonstrates that
CertiCrypt blends well with large and complex mathematical libraries,and is apt to
support proofs involving advanced algebraic and number-thoretical reasoning.
Organization of the paper.The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion ?? provides a brief introduction toCertiCrypt. Section?? introduces the notion
of statistical distance between probabilistic programs and describes programming lan-
guage techniques to bound it, whereas Sect.?? defines weak forms of observational
equivalence and their associated reasoning principles. Section ?? presents a machine-
checked proof of the indifferentiability of a generalization of Brier et al.’s construction
from a random oracle into an abelian finite group; its application to elliptic curves is
discussed in Sect.??. We survey prior art and conclude in Sections??and??.
2 An Overview of CertiCrypt
This section provides a brief description of theC rtiCrypt framework. We refer the
reader to [?] for further details.
2.1 Representation of Distributions
CertiCrypt adopts the monadic representation of distributions proposed by Audebaud
and Paulin in [?]. A distribution over a setA is represented as a monotonic, continuous
and linear function of type
D(A) def= (A→ [0, 1])→ [0, 1]
where[0, 1] denotes the unit interval. Intuitively, an element of typeD(A) models the
expectation operator of a sub-probability distribution overA. Thus, the probability that
a distributionµ : D(A) assigns to an eventX ⊆ A can be computed by measuring its




We model games as probabilistic imperative programs with procedure calls. The set of
commandsC is defined inductively by the clauses:
C ::= skip nop
| V ← E deterministic assignment
| V $← DE random assignment
| if E then C else C conditional
| while E do C while loop
| V ← P(E , . . . , E) procedure call
| C; C sequence
whereV is a set of variables tagged with their scope (either local orgl bal),E is a set
of deterministic expressions, andDE is a set of expressions that denote distributions
from which values can be sampled in random assignments. In the remainder, we let
true ⊕δ false denote the Bernoulli distribution with success probability δ, so that the
instructionx $← true ⊕δ false assignstrue to x with probabilityδ, and we denote by
x $← A the instruction that assigns tox a value uniformly chosen from a finite setA.
A program (or game) consists of a commandc and an environmentE that maps
procedure identifiers to their declaration, specifying itsformal parameters, its body, and
a return expression that is evaluated upon exit. (Although procedures are single-exit, we
often write games using explicitreturn expressions for the sake of readability.) Decla-
rations are subject to well-formedness and well-typednessconditions; these conditions
are enforced using the underlying dependent type system ofCoq. Procedures corre-
sponding to adversaries are modelled as procedures with unknown code.
Program states (or memories) are dependently typed functions that map a variable of
typeT to a value in its interpretationJT K; we letM denote the set of states. Expressions
have a deterministic semantics: an expressione f typeT is interpreted as a function
JeK :M→ JT K. The semantics of a commandc in an environmentE relates an initial
memory to a probability sub-distribution over final memories: Jc, EK : M → D(M).
We often omit the environment when it is irrelevant.
By specializing the above definition of probabilityPr [µ : X ] to programs, we have
that the probabilityPr [G,m : X ] of an eventX in a gameG and an initial memorym
is given byJGK m 1X . The probability of termination of a gameG starting in an initial
memorym is given byPr [G,m : true]. We say that a game islosslessif it terminates
with probability1 independently from the initial memory.
In order to reason about program complexity and define the class of probabilistic
polynomial-time computations, the semantics of programs is instrumented to compute
the time and memory cost of evaluating a command, given the tim and memory cost
of each construction in the expression language.
2.3 Reasoning Tools
CertiCrypt provides several tools for reasoning about games. One main tool is a prob-
abilistic relational Hoare logic. Its judgments are of the form |= G1 ∼ G2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ,
whereG1 andG2 are games, andΨ andΦ are relations over states. We represent rela-
tions as first-order formulae over tagged program variables; w use the tags〈1〉 and〈2〉
to distinguish between the value of a variable or formula in the left and right-hand side
program, respectively.
Formally, a judgment|= G1 ∼ G2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ is valid, iff for all memoriesm1 andm2
such thatm1 Ψ m2, we have that(JG1K m1)L(Φ) (JG2K m2), whereL(Φ) denotes the
lifting of Φ to distributions. Relational Hoare logic can be used to prove claims about
the probability of events in games by using, for instance, thfollowing rule:
m1 Ψ m2 |= G1 ∼ G2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ Φ =⇒ (A〈1〉 =⇒ B〈2〉)
Pr [G1,m1 : A] ≤ Pr [G2,m2 : B]
Observational equivalence is defined by specializing the judgments to relationsΨ and
Φ corresponding to the equality relation on subsets of program v riables. Formally, let
X be a set of variables,m1,m2 ∈ M andf1, f2 :M→ [0, 1]. We define
m1 =X m2
def
= ∀x ∈ X. m1(x) = m2(x)
f1 =X f2
def
= ∀m1 m2. m1 =X m2 =⇒ f1(m1) = f2(m2)
Then, two gamesG1 andG2 are observationally equivalent w.r.t. an input set of variables
I and an output set of variablesO, written |= G1 ≃IO G2, iff |= G1 ∼ G2 : =I ⇒ =O.
Equivalently,|= G1 ≃IO G2 iff for all memoriesm1,m2 ∈ M and functionsf1, f2 :
M→ [0, 1],
m1 =I m2 ∧ f1 =O f2 =⇒ JG1K m1 f1 = JG2K m2 f2
Observational equivalence is amenable to automation.CertiCrypt provides mechanized
tactics based on dependency analyses to perform common program transformations
and to prove that two programs are observationally equivalent (note that observational
equivalence is only a partial equivalence relation). The mechanized transformations
include dead code elimination, call inlining, inter- and intra-procedural code motion
and expression propagation.
We sometimes use a standard Hoare logic for reasoning about single programs. Its
judgments are of the form{P}G {Q}, whereG is a game andP andQ are predicates
on states. Formally, a judgment{P} G {Q} is valid iff for every memorym ∈ M and
functionf :M→ [0, 1],
P m ∧ (∀m. Q m =⇒ f(m) = 0) =⇒ JGK m f = 0
This logic is subsumed by the relational Hoare logic,
|= {P}G {Q} ⇐⇒ |= G ∼ skip : P 〈1〉 ⇒ Q〈1〉
3 Statistical Distance
Statistical distance quantifies the largest difference betwe n the probability that two
distributions assign to the same event. We refer to [?] for an in-depth presentation of
statistical distance and its properties. Formally, the statistical distance∆ (µ1, µ2) be-





|µ1 f − µ2 f |
One important property of statistical distance that we frequently use in proofs is its
invariance under function application, i.e. for any function F : D(A) → D(B) and
distributionsµ1, µ2 overA, ∆ (F (µ1), F (µ2)) ≤ ∆ (µ1, µ2).
Remark.In the traditional definition of statistical distance,f ranges only over Boolean-
valued functions. Our definition is more convenient for reasoning about our monadic
formalization of distributions. We have proved inCoq that the two definitions coincide
for discrete distributions.
3.1 A Logic for Bounding Statistical Distance
Statistical distance admits a natural extension to programs; we define the statistical
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|JG1K m f − JG2K m f |
We define a logic that allows to upper bound∆m (G1,G2) by a function of the memory
m; the logic deals with judgments of the formLG1,G2M  g, where
LG1,G2M  g
def
= ∀m. ∆m (G1,G2) ≤ g m ≡ ∀m f. |JG1K m f − JG2K m f | ≤ g m
Lskip, skipM  λm. 0
[Skip]
Lx← e, x← eM  λm. 0
[Ass]
∀m. ∆ (Jµ1K m, Jµ2K m) ≤ g m
Lx $← µ1, x $← µ2M  g
[Rnd]










2M  λm.Jc1Km g




1M  g1 Lc2, c
′
2M  g2




2M  λm. if JbK m then g1 m else g2 m
[Cond]
Lc1, c2M  g g0(m) = 0 gn+1(m) = if JbK m then Jc1K m gn + g(m) else 0
Lwhile b do c1,while b do c2M  sup(λn. gn)
[Whl]
Lp.body(E1), p.body(E2)M  g g =X g ∀x. x ∈ X ⇒ global(x)
Ly ← p(x), y ← p(x)M  g
[Call]
Fig. 1.Logic to bound the statistical distance between two probabilistic programs
Figure?? presents the main rules of the logic; for readability, rulesare stated for pairs
of commands rather than pairs of programs, and assume that this pair of programs are
executed in two fixed environmentsE1 andE2 respectively.
To prove the soundness, for instance, of the rule for sequential composition, we
introduce an intermediate programc1; c′2 (wherec1 is executed in environmentE1 and
c′2 in environmentE2) and prove that the distance betweenJc1; c
′
2K m andJc1; c
′
1K m is
bounded byJc1K m g′, while the distance betweenJc1; c′2K m andJc2; c
′
2K m is bounded
by g m. The rule for loops relies on the characterization of the semantics of a while loop
as the least upper bound of itsn-th unrolling[while e do c]n, and on the auxiliary rule
L[while b do c1]n, [while b do c2]nM  gn
Lwhile b do c1,while b do c2M  sup(λn. gn)
While the rules in Figure?? are sufficient to reason about closed programs, they do
not allow to reason about games in the presence of adversaries. We enhance the logic
with a rule that allows to bound the statistical distance betwe n calls to an adversaryA
executed in two different environmentsE1 andE2, i.e. it allows to draw conclusions
of the formLA,AM  g.3 In its simplest formulation, the rule assumes that oracles ar
instrumented with a counter that keeps track of the number ofqueries made, and that the
statistical distance between the distributions induced bya call to an oraclex← O(~e) in
E1 andE2 is upper bounded by a constantǫ, i.e.LO,OM  ǫ. In this case, the statistical
distance between calls to the adversaryA in E1 andE2 is upper bounded byq ·ǫ, where
q is an upper bound on the number of oracle calls made by the adversary.
For the application presented in Section??, we need to formalize a more power-
ful rule, in which the statistical distance between two oracle calls can depend on the
program state. Moreover, we allow the counter to be any integer xpression, and only
require that it does not decrease across oracle calls.
3 For the sake of readability, we writeLA,AM  g instead ofLx← A(~e), x← A(~e)M  g, and
likewise for oracles.
Lemma 1 (Adversary rule). LetA be an adversary and letcntr be an integer expres-











Assume that for every oracleO,
LO,OM  λm. JE1(O)K m (λm
′. h̄cntr(m,m
′))
and{cntr = i} E1(O) {i ≤ cntr}. Then,





3.2 Reasoning about Failure Events
Transitions based on failure events allow to transform a game into another game that
is semantically equivalent unless somefailure condition is triggered. The main tool to
justify such transitions is the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Fundamental Lemma).Consider two gamesG1, G2 and letA,B, andF
be events. IfPr [G1 : A ∧ ¬F ] = Pr [G2 : B ∧ ¬F ] , then
|Pr [G1 : A]− Pr [G2 : B] | ≤ max{Pr [G1 : F ] ,Pr [G2 : F ]}
Note also that if, for instance, gameG2 is lossless, thenPr [G1 : F ] ≤ Pr [G2 : F ].
WhenA = B andF = bad for some Boolean variablebad, the hypothesis of the
lemma can be automatically established by inspecting the cod of both games: it holds
if their code differs only after program points settingbad to true andbad is never reset
to false. As a corollary, if two gamesG1, G2 satisfy this syntactic criterion and e.g.G2
is lossless,LG1,G2M  λm. Pr [G2,m : bad] .
4 Weak Equivalences
In this section we introduce quantitative notions of program equivalence and equational
theories to reason about them.
4.1 Approximate Observational Equivalence
Approximate observational equivalence generalizes observational equivalence between
two games by allowing that their output distributions differ up to some quantityǫ. In-
formally, two gamesG1 andG2 areǫ-observationally equivalent w.r.t. an input set of
variablesI and an output set of variablesO iff for every pair of memoriesm1,m2
coinciding onI,
∆ ((JG1K m1)/ =O, (JG2Km2)/ =O) ≤ ǫ,
where for a distributionµ over a setA and an equivalence relationR onA, we letµ/R
denote the quotient distribution ofµ overA/R. For the purpose of formalization, it is
more convenient to rely on the following alternative characterization that does not use
quotient distributions, in part because the underlying lanuage ofCoq does not support
quotient types.
Definition 1. Two gamesG1 andG2 areǫ-observationally equivalent w.r.t. an input set
of variablesI and an output set of variablesO, written |= G1 ≃IO G2  ǫ, iff for all
memoriesm1,m2 ∈M and functionsf1, f2 :M→ [0, 1]
m1 =I m2 ∧ f1 =O f2 =⇒ |JG1K m1 f1 − JG2K m2 f2| ≤ ǫ
Figure??provides an excerpt of an equational theory for approximateobs rvational
equivalence; further and more general rules appear in the formal development. Most
rules generalize observational equivalence in the expected way. For instance, the rule
for random assignment considers the case of uniformly sampling over two finite setsA
andB: in caseA = B, one obtainsǫ = 0.
|= c1 ≃
I
O c2  ǫ1 |= c2 ≃
I
O c3  ǫ2
|= c1 ≃
I
O c3  ǫ1 + ǫ2
|= c1 ≃
I′
O′ c2  ǫ
′ I ′ ⊆ I O ⊆ O′ ǫ′ ≤ ǫ
|= c1 ≃
I
O c2  ǫ
|= c1 ≃
I






















2  ǫ ∀m,m
′. I m m′ =⇒ JbK m = Jb′K m′
|= if b then c1 else c2 ≃
I
O if b
′ then c′1 else c
′
2  ǫ











|= x $← A ≃
I
I∪{x} x $← B  ǫ
Fig. 2. Selected rules for reasoning about approximate observational equivalence
4.2 A Conditional Variant
The application we describe in Section?? requires reasoning about conditional approx-
imate observational equivalence, a generalization of approximate observational equiv-










Intuitively, µ |P 1Q yields the conditional probability ofQ givenP .
Definition 2. A gameG1 conditioned on predicateP1 is ǫ-observationally equivalent
to a gameG2 conditioned onP2 w.r.t. an input set of variablesI and an output set
of variablesO, written |= [G1]P1 ≃
I
O [G2]P2  ǫ, iff for any m1,m2 ∈ M and
f1, f2 :M→ [0, 1],
m1 =I m2 ∧ f1 =O f2 =⇒ |(JG1K m1) |P1 f1 − (JG2K m2) |P2 f2| ≤ ǫ
Conditional approximate observational equivalence subsume classic approximate
observational equivalence, which can be recovered by takingP1 = P2 = true.
5 Indifferentiability
In this section we present an application of the techniques introduced above to prove the
security of cryptographic constructions in the indifferentiability framework of Maurer
et al. [?]. In particular, we consider the notion of indifferentiability from a random
oracle. A random oracle is an ideal primitive that maps elements in some domain into
uniformly and independently distributed values in a finite set; queries are answered
consistently so that identical queries are given the same answer. A proof conducted in
the random oracle model for a functionh : A → B assumes thath is made publicly
available to all parties.
Definition 3 (Indifferentiability). A procedureF that has access to a random oracle
h : {0, 1}∗ → A is said to be(tS , tD, q1, q2, ǫ)-indifferentiable from a random oracle
H : {0, 1}∗ → B if there exists a simulatorS with oracle access toH and executing
within timetS such that any distinguisherD running within timetD and making at most
q1 queries to an oracleO1 andq2 queries to an oracleO2 has at most probabilityǫ of
distinguishing a scenario whereO1 is implemented asF andO2 ash from a scenario
whereO1 is implemented asH andO2 asS instead. Put in terms of games,
Game G : L← nil; b← D( )
Oracle O1(x) : return F(x)
Oracle O2(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
y $← A; L(x)← y
return L(x)
Game G′ : L← nil; b← D( )
Oracle O1(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
y $← B; L(x)← y
return L(x)
Oracle O2(x) : return S(x)
|Pr [G : b = true]− Pr [G′ : b = true] | ≤ ǫ
Random oracles into elliptic curves over finite fields are typically built from a ran-
dom oracleh on the underlying field and a deterministic encodingf that maps elements
of the field into the elliptic curve. Examples of such encodings include Icart function [?]
and the Shallue-Woestijne-Ulas (SWU) algorithm [?]. In general, and in particular for
the aforementioned mappings, the functionf is not surjective and only covers a frac-
tion of points in the curve. Hence, the naive definition of a hash functionH asf ◦ h
would not cover the whole curve, contradicting the assumption hatH behaves as a
random oracle. In a recent paper, Brier et al. [?] show how to build hash functions into
elliptic curves that are indifferentiable from a random oracle from a particular class of
encodings, including both SWU and Icart encodings.
We prove the indifferentiability of the construction put forward by Brier et al. in the
formal framework ofCertiCrypt. The proof introduces two intermediate constructions
and is structured in three steps:
1. We first prove that any efficiently invertible encodingf can be turned into aweak
encoding(Theorem??);
2. We then show an efficient construction to transform any weak encodingf into an
admissible encoding(Theorem??);
3. Finally, we prove that any admissible encoding can be turned i to a hash function
indifferentiable from a random oracle (Theorem??).
Moreover, we show in Sect.?? that Icart encoding is efficiently invertible and thus
yields a hash function indifferentiable from a random oracle when plugged in into the
above construction. We recall the alternative definitions of weak and admissible encod-
ing from [?]. Note that these do not match the definitions in [?], but, in comparison, are
better behaved: e.g. admissible encodings as we define them are closed under functional
composition and cartesian product.
Definition 4 (Weak encoding).A functionf : S → R is an (α, ǫ)-weak encoding
if it is computable in polynomial-time and there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithmIf : R→ S⊥ such that
1. {true} r $← R; s← If (r) {s = ⊥ ∨ f(s) = r}
2. |= [r $← R; s← If (r)]s6=⊥ ≃
∅
{s} [s
$← S]  ǫ
3. Pr [r $← R; s← If (r) : s = ⊥] ≤ 1− α−1
Definition 5 (Admissible encoding).A functionf : S → R is anǫ-admissible encod-
ing if it is computable in polynomial-time and there exists aprobabilistic polynomial-
time algorithmIf : R→ S⊥ such that
1. {true} r $← R; s← If (r) {s = ⊥ ∨ f(s) = r}
2. |= r $← R; s← If (r) ≃∅{s} s
$← S  ǫ
Brier et al. [?] prove that ifG is a finite cyclic group of orderN with generator
g, a function intoG indifferentiable from a random oracle can be built from any poly-
nomially invertible functionf : A → G and hash functionsh1 : {0, 1}⋆ → A and
h2 : {0, 1}∗ → ZN as follows:
H(m) def= f(h1(m))⊗ g
h2(m) (1)
Intuitively, the termgh2(m) behaves as a one-time pad and ensures thatH covers all
points in the group even iff covers only a fraction. Our proof generalizes this construc-
tion to finitely generated abelian groups.
We begin by showing that any efficiently invertible encodingis a weak encoding.
Theorem 1. Let f : S → R be a function computable in polynomial-time such that
for any r ∈ R, #f−1(r) ≤ B. Assume there exists a polynomial-time algorithmI
that givenr ∈ R outputs the setf−1(r). Then,f is an (α, 0)-weak encoding, with
α = B #R/#S.
Proof. UsingI, we build a partial inverterIf : R → S⊥ of f that satisfies the proper-
ties in Definition??:
If (r) : X ← I(r); b $← true⊕#X/B false;
if b = true then s $← X ; return s else return ⊥
First observe thatIf (r) fails with probability1−#f−1(r)/B or else returns an element
uniformly chosen from the set of pre-images ofr, and thus satisfies the first property
trivially. In addition, for anyx ∈ S we have
Pr [r $← R; s← If (r) : s = x] =
1
B#R










Hence, for a uniformly chosenr, the probability ofIf (r) failing is exactly1 − α−1,
and the probability of returning any particular value inS conditioned to not failing is
uniform.
We show next how to construct an admissible encoding from a weak-encoding into
a finite abelian group. Recall that every finite abelian groupG is isomorphic to a product
of cyclic groups4
G ≃ Zn1 × · · · × Znk
If we fix generatorsgi for eachZni , then anyx ∈ G admits a unique representation
as a vector(gz11 , . . . , g
zk
k ). We uselog to denote the operator that returns the canonical
representation~z = (z1, . . . , zk) for anyx ∈ G.
Theorem 2. LetG ≃ Zn1×· · ·×Znk be a finite abelian group and letgi be a generator
of Zni for i = 1 . . . k. Assume thatf : A → G is an (α, ǫ)-weak encoding. Then, the
function
F : A× Zn1 × · · · × Znk → G
F (a, z1, . . . , zk) = f(a)⊗ g
z1
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ g
zk
k






Proof. Sincef is a weak encoding, there exists a polynomial-time computable inverter
If of f satisfying the conditions in Definition??. LetT ∈ N be polynomially bounded.
Using If , we build a partial inverterIF of F that satisfies the properties in Defini-
tion ??:
IF (r) : i← 0; a← ⊥;
while (i ≤ T ∧ a = ⊥) do
~z $← Zn1 × · · · × Znk ;
x← r ⊗ g−z11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ g
−zk
k ;
a← If (x); i← i + 1
end;
if a 6= ⊥ then return (a, ~z) else return ⊥
4 The decomposition can be made unique by fixing additional conditi s onn1 . . . nk.
Game G1 : r $← G; s← IF (r)
Game G2 :
r $← G;
i← 0; a← ⊥;
while (i ≤ T ∧ a = ⊥) do
x $← G; ~z ← log (r ⊗ x
−1);
a← If (x); i← i+ 1
end;
if a 6= ⊥ then s← (a, ~z) else s← ⊥
Game G3 :
r $← G;
i← 0; a← ⊥;
while (i ≤ T ∧ a = ⊥) do
x $← G; a← If (x); i← i+ 1
end;
~z ← log (r ⊗ x−1);
if a 6= ⊥ then s← (a, ~z) else s← ⊥
Game G4 :
i← 0; a← ⊥;
while (i ≤ T ∧ a = ⊥) do
x $← G; a← If (x); i← i+ 1
end;
~z $← ~Z;
if a 6= ⊥ then s← (a, ~z) else s← ⊥
Game G5 G6 :
i← 0; a← ⊥;
while (i ≤ T ∧ a = ⊥) do
x $← G; a← If (x); i← i+ 1
end;
~z $← ~Z;
if a 6= ⊥ then a $← A; s← (a, ~z)
else bad← true;
s← ⊥ a $← A; s← (a, ~z)
Game G7 : s $← A× Z
Fig. 3. Sequence of games used in Theorem??
The partial inverterIF runs in timetIF = (T + 1) tIf , wheretIf is a bound on the
running time ofIf . Hence,IF is polynomial-time for any polynomially boundedT .
For the sake of readability in the following we use~Z to denoteZn1 × · · ·×Znk and
~g~z to denotegz11 ⊗ · · · ⊗ g
zk
k . We prove that
|= r $← G; s← IF (r) ≃
∅
{s} s
$← A× ~Z  ǫ′
using the sequence of gamesG1, . . . ,G7 shown in Figure??, the mechanized program
transformations ofCertiCrypt, and the proof rules for observational and approximate
observational equivalence. We briefly describe the proof below.
We obtain gameG2 by first inlining the call toIF in the initial game and then
applying the following algebraic equivalence to transformthe body of thewhile loop:
|= ~z $← ~Z; x← r ⊗ ~g−~z ≃
{r}
{r,x,z} x
$← G; ~z ← log (r ⊗ x−1)
We obtain gameG3 by moving the assignment to~z outside the loop in gameG2.
This transformation is semantics-preserving because~z is never used inside the loop
and the value that it has when exiting the loop only depends onthe value ofx in the
last iteration. Formally, this is proven by unfolding the first iteration of the loop and
establishing that the relation
={i,x,a,r} ∧ (~z = log (r ⊗ x
−1))〈1〉
is a relational invariant between the loop inG2 and the loop resulting from removing
the assignment to~z. By appending~z ← log (r ⊗ x−1) to the latter loop, we recover
equivalence on~z.
Sincer is no longer used inside the loop, we can postpone its definition after the
loop, and use the following algebraic equivalence to sample~z instead ofr
|= r $← G; ~z ← log (r ⊗ x−1) ≃
{x}
{r,x,z} ~z
$← ~Z; r ← x⊗ ~g~z,
We obtainG4 by additionally removing the assignment tor, which is now dead code.
For the next step in the proof we use the fact thatf is a weak encoding and therefore
the distribution ofa after a calla ← If (x) conditioned toa 6= ⊥ is ǫ-away from the
uniform distribution. This allows us to resample the value of a after the loop, provided
a 6= ⊥, incurring a penaltyǫ on the statistical distance of the distribution ofs between
G4 andG5. To prove this formally, letb be the condition of the loop andc its body. Ob-
serve that the semantics of the loop coincides with the semantics of its(T+1)-unrolling
[while b do c]T+1. We show by induction onT that for any[0, 1]-valued functionsf, g
s.t.f ={a′} g,




c1 = [while b do c]T+1; if a 6= ⊥ then a′ ← a
c2 = [while b do c]T+1; if a 6= ⊥ then a′ $← A
f ′(m) = if m(a) 6= ⊥ then f(m) else 0
g′(m) = if m(a) 6= ⊥ then g(m) else 0
and use this to conclude theǫ-approximate equivalence ofG4 andG5.
SinceG5 andG6 are syntactically equivalent except for code appearing after flag
bad is set, we apply the corollary of the Fundamental Lemma in Section ?? to obtain
the bound
LG5,G6M  Pr [G5 : bad]
Since the probability of failure ofIf on a uniformly chosen input is upper bounded by
1− α−1, we can show by induction onT that










By coalescing the branches in the conditional at the end ofG6 and removing dead
code, we prove that the game is observational equivalent w.r.t a and~z to the game
a $← A; ~z $← ~Z; s← (a, z), which is trivially equivalent toG7.
By composing the above results, we conclude
|= G1 ≃
∅





We must also show thats = ⊥ ∨ F (s) = r is a post-condition ofG1. As G1 and
G3 are observationally equivalent with respect tos andr, it is sufficient to establish the
validity of the post-condition forG3. We show thata 6= ⊥ ⇒ x = f(a) is an invariant
of the loop. When the loop finishes, eithera = ⊥ and in this cases = ⊥, or a 6= ⊥ and
we haveF (s) = f(a)⊗ ~g~z = x⊗ r ⊗ x−1 = r.
Finally, we show that the composition of an admissible encoding f : S → R and a
random oracle intoS is indifferentiable from a random oracle intoR.
Theorem 3. Let f : S → R be anǫ-admissible encoding with inverter algorithm
If and leth : {0, 1}⋆ → S be a random oracle. Then,f ◦ h is (tS , tD, q1, q2, ǫ′)-
indifferentiable from a random oracle intoR, wheretS = q1 tIf andǫ
′ = 2(q1 + q2)ǫ.
Before moving to the proof of Theorem??, we prove the following useful result.
Lemma 3. Let f : S → R be anǫ-admissible encoding with inverter algorithmIf .
Then
|= s $← S; r ← f(s) ≃∅{r,s} r




= s $← S; r ← f(s)
cf
def
= r $← R; s← If (r)
c1
def
= ci; if s = ⊥ then r $← R else r ← f(s)
c2
def
= cf ; if s = ⊥ then bad← true; r $← R else r ← f(s)
c3
def
= cf ; if s = ⊥ then bad← true else r ← f(s)




Due to the second property of Definition??, the distributions ofs after executingci and
cf areǫ-away. Using the rules for approximate observational equivalence, we obtain
|= c1 ≃
∅
{r,s} c2  ǫ
The corollary to the Fundamental Lemma in Section?? implies thatLc2, c3M 
Pr [c2 : bad]. Moreover,
Pr [c2 : bad] = 1− Pr [cf : s 6= ⊥] = Pr [s $← S : s 6= ⊥]− Pr [cf : s 6= ⊥] ≤ ǫ
where the last inequality holds again because of the second property of Definition??.




{r,s} c3  ǫ
BecauseIf is a partial inverter forf , theelse branch of the conditional inc3 has
no effect and can be removed, and thus|= c3 ≃∅{r,s} cf . We conclude by transitivity of
approximate observational equivalence.
Proof (of Theorem??). LetD be a distinguisher against the indifferentiability off ◦ h
making at mostq1 queries toO1 and at mostq2 queries toO2. We exhibit a simulator
S that uses a random oracle intoR to simulateh and show thatD cannot distinguish a
gameG whereO1 andO2 are implemented byf ◦ h andh respectively from a game
G′ where they are implemented byS and a random oracle intoR instead. An overview
Game G : L← nil; b← D( )
Oracle O1(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L1) then
s $← S; L1(x)← s
return L1(x)
Oracle O2(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L2) then
s← O1(x); r ← f(s); L2(x)← r
return L2(x)
Game G′ : L← nil; b← D( )
Oracle O1(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L1) then
r ← O2(x); s← If (r); L1(x)← s
return L1(x)
Oracle O2(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L2) then
r $← R; L2(x)← r
return L2(x)
Game G1 : L← nil; b← A( )
Oracle O(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
s $← S; r ← f(s); L(x)← (s, r)
return L(x)
Game G2 : L← nil; b← A( )
Oracle O(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
r $← R; s← If (r); L(x)← (s, r)
return L(x)
Game Gbad1 : L← nil; b← A( )
Oracle O(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
if |L| < q1 + q2 then
s $← S; r ← f(s)
else bad← true; s $← S; r ← f(s)
L(x)← (s, r)
return L(x)
Game Gbad2 : L← nil; b← A( )
Oracle O(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
if |L| < q1 + q2 then
s $← S; r ← f(s)
else bad← true; r $← R; s← If (r)
L(x)← (s, r)
return L(x)
Fig. 4. Games used in the proof of Theorem??
of the proof, including these two games and the definition of the simulator is shown in
Figure??.
Our goal is to prove
|Pr [G : b = true]− Pr [G′ : b = true] | ≤ 2(q1 + q2)ǫ (3)
The crux of the proof is an application of Lemma??. In order to apply it, we need first
to transform the initial games to replace oraclesO1 andO2 by a single joint oracle that
simultaneously returns the responses of both. UsingD, we construct an adversaryA
with access to a single joint oracle, such that gamesG andG′ are equivalent to games
G1 andG2 in the figure. AdversaryA simply calls the distinguisherD and forwards the
value it returns; it simulatesO1 andO2 by using its own oracleO.
We assume without loss of generality the equivalence between gamesG andG1,
andG′ andG2, respectively. This is identical to the assumption in [?] that the distin-
guisher always makes the same queries to both its oracles. GamesG1 andG2 satisfy the
equalities:
Pr [G : b = true] = Pr [G1 : b = true] Pr [G
′ : b = true] = Pr [G2 : b = true]
Furthermore, sinceD makes at mostq1 queries toO1 andq2 queries to oracleO2, A
makes at mostq = q1 + q2 queries to its oracle.
We next transform the implementation of oracleO in gamesG1 andG2 to enforce
the boundq1+ q2 on the total number of queries. After the allotted number of queries is
exhausted, oracleO behaves the same way in the two games. This ensures that further
queries will not make the statistical distance between the two games grow and paves the
way to applying Lemma??. This transformation preserves observational equivalence
because we know thatAwill not make more queries than allowed. One way of justifying
this is using the syntactic criterion for Lemma??: we annotate the games with a flag








Gbad2 : b = true ∧ ¬bad
]








Gbad2 : b = true
]
We can now apply Lemma?? between gamesG2 andGbad2 , takingcntr = |L| and
h(i) = if i < q then 2ǫ else 0. The second hypothesis of the lemma, i.e that a call to
E2(O) cannot decrease|L|, is immediate. We can assume that2qǫ < 1 (otherwise the









We are only left to prove that
LE2(O), E
bad
2 (O)M  λm. JE2(O)K m (λm
′. h̄cntr(m,m
′))
Doing a case analysis on the conditionsm ∈ dom(L) and|L| < q yields four cases;
three of them yield a null distance and are immediate. The remaining case, wherem /∈
dom(L) and |L| < q, yields a distance2ǫ and follows from Lemma??. We finally
obtainLG2,Gbad2 M  2(q1+ q2)ǫ, which combined with the previous results implies the
desired inequality.
6 Application to Elliptic Curves
This section discuss the application of the proof presentedin the previous section to
hashing into elliptic curves.
Let Fpm be a finite field of cardinalpm, with p > 3 prime. An elliptic curve over
Fpm is defined by the equationY 2 = X3 + aX + b where the parametersa, b are
elements ofFpm such that4a3 +27b2 6= 0 (the curve must be non-singular). The set of
points of such a curve, which we denoteEa,b, can be construed as a finite abelian group
with thepoint at infiniteO as the identity element. Furthermore, it can be shown that
the groupEa,b is either cyclic or a product of two cyclic groups.
Hence, applying the results from the previous section, any pol nomially invertible
function into aEa,b can be transformed into a hash function that is indifferentiable from
a random oracle. In particular, this holds for Icart encoding, as we show next.







(x, ux+ v) if u 6= 0
((−b)
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3 , 0) if u = 0 ∧ a = 0
















As a side remark, observe that the original definition only deals with the casea 6= 0;
the definition for the casea = 0 was suggested to us by Thomas Icart in a private
communication.
The set of pre-images of a point in the curve under Icart functio can be computed
efficiently by solving for the roots of polynomials overFpm of degree at most 4—any





{0} if a 6= 0





{u|u3 − 6uX + 6Y = 0} if a = 0
{u|u4 − 6u2X + 6uY = 3a} if a 6= 0
This can be done using any efficient algorithm for factoring polynomials over finite
fields, e.g. Berlekamp’s algorithm. Thus, Icart encoding ispolynomially invertible.
Formalization. To apply our generic proof of indifferentiability to Icart function, we
proceeded as follows:
1. We integrated Théry’s formalization of elliptic curves[?] in our framework, and
showed that the set of points of the elliptic curveEa,b can be construed as a finite
cyclic group, as defined in SSREFLECT standard library [?];
2. We defined Icart function, and showed that it generates points in the curveEa,b.
This required showing the existence of cubic roots in the field Fpm (the cubic root
of x ∈ Fpm is the elementx(2p
m−1)/3);
3. We defined the inverse of Icart function, for which we needed to assume a polyno-
mially efficient method for factoring polynomials of degree4 over the underlying
field, as no existingCoq library readily provides the necessary background;
4. We applied Theorem?? to show that Icart function is an(α, 0)-weak encoding,
with α = 4N/pm whereN is the order ofEa,b;
5. We applied Theorem??to show thatF : Fpm×ZN , defined asF (u, z) = fa,b(u)+
gz, whereg is a generator ofZN , is anǫ-admissible encoding, withǫ = (1−α−1)T
for any polynomially boundedT ;
6. We finally applied Theorem?? to show that ifF is composed with a random oracle
into Fpm × ZN (equivalently, a random oracle intoFpm and a random oracle into
ZN ), the resulting construction is(tS , tD, q1, q2, 2(q1+ q2)ǫ)-indifferentiable from
a random oracle intoEa,b, wheretS = q1 tIF = q1 (T + 1) tf−1 andtf−1 is an
upper bound on the time needed to compute the pre-image of a point under Icart
function, i.e. to solve a polynomial of degree 4 inFpm .
7 Related Work
Weak Equivalences.The impossibility to achieve perfect security has motivated s v-
eral proposals for weaker, quantitative, definitions of security. Prominent examples in-
clude notions of confidentiality based on information theory [?,?,?,?]. More recently,
Dwork [?] has suggested differential privacy as an alternative notio that quantifies the
privacy guaranteed by confidential data analysis; Barthe etal. [?] builds on the work
presented in this paper and reports on an extension of theCertiCrypt framework for
reasoning about differential privacy. All of these definitions can be construed as quan-
titative hyperproperties [?], and readily extend to relational properties that are closely
related to statistical distance.
Approximate observational equivalence is also closely related to weak notions of
bisimulations [?]. In fact, approximate observational equivalence naturally generalizes
to an approximate relational Hoare logic. The latter is based on a notion of approximate
lifting of a relation that is closely related to the notion used in [?].
Hashing into Elliptic Curves.A number of highly relevant cryptographic constructions,
including identity based schemes [?] and password based key exchange protocols [?],
require hashing into elliptic curves. Indeed, there have been a number of proposals for
such hash functions, see for instance [?,?,?]. Recently, Farashahi et al. [?] developed
powerful techniques to show the indifferentiability of hasfunction constructions based
on deterministic encodings. Their results improve on [?], in the sense that they apply to
a larger class of encodings, including encodings to hyperelliptic curves, and that they
provide tighter bounds for encodings that are covered by both methods.
Formalization and Verification of Elliptic Curves.To our best knowledge, our work
provides the first machine-checked proof of security for a cryptographic primitive based
on elliptic curves. There are, however, previous works on the formalization of elliptic
curves: Hurd, Gordon and Fox [?] report on the verification in HOL of the group laws,
and an application to showing the functional correctness ofElGamal encryption. Théry
and Hanrot [?] used theCoq proof assistant to formalize the group laws, and show how
the formalization of elliptic curves can be used to build efficient reflective tactics for
testing primality.
8 Conclusion
This paper reports on a machine-checked proof of a recent construction to build hash
functions that are indifferentiable from a random oracle into an elliptic curve. The ex-
ample is singular among other examples that have been formalized usingCertiCrypt,
because it involves complex reasoning about algebraic geometry and requires the for-
malization of new weak forms of program equivalence.
The formalization establishes the ability ofCertiCrypt to integrate smoothly with
existing libraries of complex mathematics. Overall, the formalization consists of over
65,000 lines ofCoq (without counting components reused from the standard libraries
of Coq andSSReflect), which break down as follows: 45,000 lines corresponding to
the originalCertiCrypt framework, 3,500 lines of extensions toCertiCrypt, 7,000 lines
written originally for our application to indifferentiability, and 10,000 lines of a slightly
adapted version of Théry [?] elliptic curve library.
Our work paves the way for further developments. We are particularly interested in
leveraging our earlier formalization of zero-knowledge protocols [?] to statistical zero-
knowledge, and to use the result as a back-end for a certifying ZK compiler, in the style
of [?]. We also intend to pursue the machine-checked formalization of indifferentia-
bility proofs, and in particular to show that the finalists ofNIST SHA-3 competition
are indifferentiable from a random oracle. Finally, it would be of interest to enhance
EasyCrypt [?], an automated front-end that generates verifiable security proofs inCer-
tiCrypt, so that it can manipulate the notions of equivalence considered in this paper
(and in [?]).
